Integration processes of migrants in the European Union and policies relating to integration.


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1. Introduction.

Most of the contributions to this conference have been focused on demographic developments within Turkey in the recent past and the near future. Demography is a 'hard science' in the sense that it is able to predict pretty accurate how many individuals there will be in certain populations and what their basic characteristics such as age and sex will be. Such 'hard' data, however, become softer, when the question is asked where these individuals will be in the future; in other words, migration trends for the future, particularly these of international migration, are much more difficult to predict, because they are dependent on many non-demographic variables. Things become even more difficult, when the question is posed, how the demographically forecasted individuals, particularly the international migrants among them, will identify themselves or will be categorized by the countries of settlement. Will they, although born as Turks, in the future always be Turks, or will part of them not only become integrated in the countries of settlement, but possibly also be full fledged citizens of these countries? The answers to such questions cannot be found in demography, nor in the domain of international migration studies (delineated as the study of mobility across political borders), but should be sought in the domain of study of processes of integration of immigrants into societies of settlement and policies related to processes of integration. In this contribution I will focus on the last mentioned domain.

Integration of immigrants is a hotly debated topic nowadays, particularly in Northwest-European countries and cities. The background of this contentious debate is historically different in various countries. In the Netherlands, for example, a tradition of specific 'integration policies' under the heading of 'minorities policies'
has been built up already since the beginning of 1980s. These policies, however, are now heavily under fire in a strongly politicized climate. Integration has been declared to have failed and particularly so-called multicultural aspects are rejected. A comparable development can be found in Sweden, where early integration policies have become politicized in a comparable way as in the Netherlands (see the contributions of Hammar and Tamas in Jandl & Stacher 2004). In other Northwest-European countries, like the FRG, the topic of immigrants was politicized much earlier, preventing integration policies from coming into existence; only very recently a political compromise was reached on a new Law on Immigration and Integration (Suessmuth-report 2001).

On the EU-level integration policies are quite new. There is a somewhat longer history of trying to establish a common immigration policy for EU-countries: the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, coming into force in May 1999, laid the legal foundation for a harmonization of asylum and communitarian immigration policies in the EU. The Tampere Summit in 1999 developed a political programme and a work plan to arrive gradually at a harmonized, common immigration policy. The Communication on a Community Immigration Policy (November 22nd, 2000) has set the framework for such policies (EC 2000) and in the first four years after the enactment of the Amsterdam Treaty 23 binding regulations have been accepted; eleven of these 23 relate to borders and visa, six to illegal immigration and expulsion, five to asylum, and one to legal migration (Groenendijk and Minderhoud 2004, 139 ff). The topics reflect the still dominant preoccupation with control-oriented migration regulation at the EU-level.

Integration appeared only as a topic since mid-2003, when the Communication on Immigration, Integration and Employment of June 3rd (EC 2003)) was published. Under the Greek presidency at the Thessaloniki summit of June 2003 this document was accepted as a basis for developing a EU-integration policy, however, not as a communitarian policy (like immigration policy), but as a 'Third Pillar'-policy, which means essentially that any common initiative can only be implemented by unanimous decisions of the Council of Ministers.

The topic of integration processes and policies is thus neglected in the past and at the same time on its way to the top of the political agenda at the local, national and EU-
level. In this contribution I want to clear up some of the confusion in the debates about integration processes and policies by developing a conceptual framework and by drawing lessons from past experience. I will do that by taking the following steps:

1. Firstly, I will make some basic observations on what I call the logic of integration processes. I will explore the nature of such processes, its conceptualization and lessons from empirical research. The reason for this is based on the assumption that if a policy wants to steer such a process, it should have a thorough, science-based knowledge of processes of integration and exclusion in order to decide with which instruments it can possibly intervene, in which part of the process, at what particular moment.

2. Such knowledge is a solid starting point for policymaking, but it is not enough. The process of policymaking and implementation has its own logic, which does not necessarily run parallel to the logic of integration processes. That’s why I will turn to some basic notions of the logic of policy making as a second step.

3. In the third step I will ask the question: if we have a sound knowledge of integration processes, and if we have managed to formulate adequate policies to steer, or at least smoothen that process, who has to implement policies (actors) and at what level? How do policies at the local, national and EU-level relate to each other?

4. The fourth step is still more concrete: what strategies should be followed in implementing policies to be successful?

2. The logic of integration processes and exclusion

At the moment immigrants settle in a new society they have to acquire a place, both in the physical sense (a house, a job and income, access to educational and health facilities, etc), but also in the social and cultural sense. Particularly if newcomers see themselves as different and are perceived by the receiving society as physically, culturally and/or religiously 'different', they aspire to become accepted also in these respects. It is from these observations that I deduce a basic and at the same time comprehensive definition of integration: the process of becoming an accepted part of society.

This elementary definition of integration is – on purpose – open in two ways. Firstly, it emphasizes the processual character rather than defining an end situation; it
suggests furthermore that any integration process (and thus policies) should look at three dimensions or domains: the legal/political domain, the socio-economic domain and the cultural/religious domain. Secondly, it is open because it does not state the particular requirements for acceptance by the receiving society (in contradistinction to the normative models that have been developed by political theorists: assimilation, multiculturalism, pluralism, etc.), thereby leaving room for contextual variations and for different temporal (in-between) and final outcomes. That makes the definition more useful both for the empirical study of these processes, but also for policy discussions in diverging national and city contexts.

There are thus at least two parties involved in integration processes: the immigrants, with their particular characteristics, efforts and adaptation; and the receiving society with its reactions to the newcomers. The interaction between these two determines the direction and the ultimate outcome of the integration process. They are, however, unequal partners. The receiving society -- its institutional structure and the way it reacts to newcomers -- is much more decisive for the outcome of the process.

This process of integration does not – as is often supposed - only take place at the level of the individual immigrant, whose integration is measured in terms of his/her housing, job, education, and social and cultural adaptation to the new society. It also takes place at the collective level of the immigrant group. Immigrant organisations mobilize resources and express the ambitions of the group. These organisations may also integrate: that is, they may become an accepted part of civil society and a potential partner in integration policies -- or they may isolate themselves or be excluded.

And thirdly, integration processes take place at the institutional level. Two types of institutions are relevant here. The first are general public institutions of the receiving societies, such as the educational system or institutional arrangements in the labour market. Laws, regulations and executive organisations as well as unwritten rules and practices are part of such institutions. These public institutions may promote integration processes of immigrants, but they may also hinder access or equal outcome for newcomers, or they may even completely exclude them. The functioning of these general public institutions, and the possible adjustment of them in view of growing diversity, is of supremely importance: on this level, integration and exclusion are mirror images (see Penninx 2001). The second type of institutions is specific to immigrant groups themselves, such as their religious or cultural institutions. Like immigrant organizations, they may become an accepted part of society at the same
level as comparable institutions of native groups, or they may isolate themselves or remain unrecognized and excluded. (For a more elaborate explanation of this argument of levels of integration see Penninx 2000).

Finally, I want to highlight another important element of the logic of integration processes: the time factor. Processes of integration of newcomers are long term by their nature. At the individual level, an adult immigrant may adapt significantly in the cognitive dimension of his behaviour: it is both pragmatic and pays off rather immediately if you learn how things are done, by whom etc. Adaptation of adults in the aesthetic and normative dimensions of their behaviour, however, tends to be less easy: knowledge may change, but feelings and likings, and evaluations of good and evil are pretty persistent within an individual’s lifetime. This is a general rule for mankind, but it becomes more manifest in those who change environments through migration.

The situation of the descendants of this ‘first generation’ of migrants differs normally in this respect. Through primary relations within their family and the network of the immigrant community they are familiarized with the immigrant community, and possibly with its background elsewhere. At the same time, however, they become thoroughly acquainted with culture and language of the society of settlement through informal contacts in the neighbourhood from their early childhood on and particularly through their participation in general institutions, the educational one in the first place. If such a double process of socialization takes place under favourable conditions (in which policies play a major role) this second generation develops a way of life and lifestyle in which they combine the roles, identities and loyalties of these different worlds and situations. Ways to do this are manifold, which makes for more and more differentiation within the original immigrant group. At the group level this means that the litmus test for integration, and for the success or failure of policies in this field, is the position of the second generation (cfr. Vermeulen & Penninx 2000).

In view of the foregoing observations, outcomes from this complex and interactive process of integration cannot be expected to be homogeneous: Diversity will be with us, whether we want it or not. Studies that compare the integration of immigrant groups within the same institutional and policy context show that different immigrant groups follow different patterns of incorporation and integration (for example Vermeulen and Penninx 2000). On the other hand, the experience of immigrants of the same ethnic
background in different national or local contexts also lead to very diverse patterns (for example Penninx and Roosblad 2000; Rath et al. 2001).

3. The logic of policy and policy making

Let us now take our second step. In order to formulate and implement effective policies we need not only a thorough insight in the logic of integration processes, we also have to get such policies politically approved and backed up. The logic of politics and policymaking, however, is one of a different kind and often problematic in relation to immigrants.

A key condition for effective integration policy is transparency of admission of immigrants and their residential and legal status. Expectations of, and actual long-term-residence should be expressed in an adequate legal position and opportunities to participate in all domains of society, including politics and policymaking, especially in policies that affect their position. The existing political system, however, often blocks such participation. This conundrum is aptly shown by the literature, both on the national level (think of the political fate of the Suessmuth-report (2001) in the FRG since 2001), and on the level of cities (see for example Mahnig on Berlin, Paris and Zurich in Penninx et al. 2004): decisions on integration policies and their content and orientation, are taken in a political system in which the majority vote decides. In such a system majority-minority relations and the actual or perceived clash of interests connected to them, are played out both on the national level and in cities. This may lead to outright exclusion of part of the immigrants (aliens) from the formal political system, or it may – in case they are (partially) included - marginalize their voice. Perceptions of immigrants turn out to be important in such a process, often more than facts. This is the more so, if the issues of immigration and the position of immigrants become politicized questions, like in the Netherlands and Rotterdam in recent years. This mechanism leads either to the absence of integration policies and avoidance of issues related to immigrants in some countries and cities, or to lop-sided and patronizing policies reflecting mainly majority interests and disregarding needs and voice of immigrants in others.

At the moment that integration policies are accepted another aspect of the logic of policymaking emerges in the implementation phase. In contradistinction to the long-term-nature of integration processes mentioned earlier, the political process in democratic societies requires policies to bear fruits within much shorter – in between
election – terms. Unrealistic promises and demands derived from such a ‘democratic impatience’ (Vermeulen and Penninx 1994) - that is the political desire to have quick solutions for problems and processes of a long-term character - often leads to backlashes. The recent vigorous debate on the (supposed) failure of integration policies in the Netherlands is a good example.

More difficult than this democratic impatience, however, is the situation in which the political climate (of anti-immigration and anti-immigrant sentiments, translated in political movements and politicization of the topics of immigration and integration) prevent well argued policy proposals from being accepted. Unfortunately, this has become the case in several European countries and cities. It means that much more attention should be given to the question of how to frame immigration and integration policies politically in such a way, that these are acceptable and accepted by the ruling political system.

The foregoing observations relate to the political process that may or may not lead to integration policies. I add now some observations on the form and content of such policies, if they have been established. I indicated earlier that integration policies are by necessity context bound. It is implicated in the answer to the question IN WHAT immigrants are supposed to integrate. This embeddedness has an ideological component and an institutional one.

On the level of states differences between countries the ideological component is expressed in the political ‘problem definition’ of immigrants and their integration, and the ensuing strategies to be applied in these policies. Simplified one can distinguish two prototypical models. (See a.o. Bauböck 1994; Bauböck et al. 1996; Brubaker 1992; Castles and Miller 1993; Favell 2000; Freeman 1995; Guiraudon 1998; Hammar 1985; Soysal 1994).

The first one defines the immigrant principally as an alien and outsider, who is only temporarily part of society. That society is emphatically not defining itself as an immigration country and migrants are therefore temporary ‘guests’. At best measures may be taken to make that temporary stay comfortable and profitable for both parties and to facilitate their anticipated return, but there is no logical ground for inclusive policies that would incorporate these immigrants as citizens or political actors. Such an exclusionary definition leads to either ‘non-policy’ or ‘guestworker policy’ (see
Forms and instruments of such policies are variant and accidental, being mostly ad-hoc reactions to concrete problems. In contradistinction to such exclusionary policies, we also find definitions that in principle include immigrants in the course of time. In the way this inclusion is envisaged, however, two distinct political definitions of immigrants and their integration can be discerned. The first one is prototypically formulated in the French, republican vision, in which – as a consequence of its vision on the state, its relation to citizens, the ensuing political system and institutional arrangements in the public sphere – the distinction between citizens and aliens is crucial: alien immigrants should preferably become citizens and thus become recognized as individual political actors. Immigrant collectivities, however, are not recognized as such. French republican terminology avoids notions like ethnicity, ethnic minorities and multiculturalism that suggest collectiveness and difference of any sort, be it related to origin, culture, religion or class. (Formal) equality on the individual level is the overriding political principle. In this sense this definition principally depoliticizes the issue of immigrants and their integration (which does not prevent immigration and perceived ‘non-integration’ becoming overriding issues of established parties).

The second prototypical inclusionary vision is the Anglo-American one, in which also immigrants are supposed to have or take up citizenship individually, but having done so, the political system leaves much room for collective manifestation and action of immigrants. Ethnicity and ethnic minorities are perceived as relevant notions, even to the extent that the total population in censuses for example, is officially registered as such. Although also in this political vision equality is an important principle, there is the additional notion that the realization of substantive equality may in practice be related to membership of cultural, ethnic, immigrant or disadvantaged groups. Political struggle between groups on issues of multiculturalism is thus an explicit part of politics (irrespective of the outcomes of such political struggles).

The internal logic of these prototypical visions leads to different strategies employed in integration policies. The first French republican system leads principally to strategies that choose for general policies, equality within the given system as priority, avoidance of designating fixed target groups and non-recognition of collective manifestations and immigrant organizations as important actors. The inherent problem of such a definition is that of mobilizing and engaging forces from within immigrant groups (which are
feared as counteracting integration) in the implementation of policies. The Anglo-American vision tends to be more inclined to designate target groups and formulate group-specific policies, even to the extent that positive discrimination or affirmative action may be part of such policies; it is more prone to recognize, if not stimulate, forms of representation of such groups, for example by extending subsidies directly to immigrant organizations, or indirectly by subsidizing certain activities of such groups; this vision is also more inclined to combine equality with cultural difference, implying recognition of cultural and religious aspects of integration processes.

On purpose I have outlined these two models of inclusion as prototypical, contrasting ones in order to illustrate their internal logic. In practice we see many variations and eclectic *bricolage* of the elements of both visions in the definitions and instruments of policies of European countries and cities (For more elaborate analyses of national and local integration policies in Europe see Penninx 2004 and Penninx et al. 2004). They may even change within one country or city in the course of time: See the Netherlands in the last decade, or the city of Amsterdam.

But apart from such specific migrant-related ideologies also institutional characteristics of states and societies matter. In the socio-economic sphere, for example, integration mechanisms in societies with a strong liberal market orientation (and limited welfare and social facilities) differ from those in caring welfare states that are more based on solidarity and redistribute a much greater part of the national income. Also in the cultural and religious domain historical peculiarities of institutional arrangements create significant differences in the feasibility of policies in certain domains. By consequence the scope, actors and instruments of policy differ.

This context-bound nature was illustrated by Vermeulen (1997) who compares immigrant policies in five European countries since the 1960s, specifically relating to a) integration and labour market policies; b) policies relating to immigrant languages, and c) policies in relation to religious systems introduced by immigrants. That study shows basically that the actual content of integration policies is to a great extent dependent on, or inspired by the pre-existent institutional arrangements in these domains within the different countries. For a country that traditionally had different recognized languages within its territory (or religions for that matter), it is in principle easier to make additional provisions for newcomers in this domain. In the same vein Vermeulen and
Slijper (2003) analyse the practice of multicultural policies in Canada, Australia and the USA. Multiculturalism differs not only in terms of its historical development in each of these countries, the practice of it turns out to be clearly context bound. Both studies pertain to the national level of states, but the same rule holds for the level of cities (see Alexander 2003; Penninx et al. 2004; Rogers and Tillie 2001).

These observations on the logic of policymaking lead to two lessons. The first is that to get policies established we need an adequate definition that makes such policies politically acceptable and endorsed. What is needed is a balanced framework that does not hide problems to be solved, but primarily stresses the common interests of all. There is much to be gained here: not only avoiding crises, that are shown to be inevitable, if problems are consistently neglected, but also restoring and promoting cohesiveness of cities and states that makes it possible to reap the potential fruits of immigration and immigrants. Acceptance of immigrants and their active participation is an essential condition in such a framework. Negotiated new forms of diversity will result from it. On this front there is still much work to do, for all actors but for politicians primarily.

A second lesson is that the viability of integration policies in the long term depends heavily on realistic targets to be attained and an adequate analysis of the institutional setting and its possibilities to build such policies on. Such a – less ideology-driven – practical approach, combined with active participation of immigrants and their organizations, will not only avoid backlash effects among the majority population, it will also result in a practice in which immigrants are involved and feel recognized.

4. Levels of integration policies and actors involved.

Integration processes from the point of view of immigrants themselves are taking place primarily at a local level, and since circumstances there may vary significantly, local policies for integration that build on interaction between immigrants and local society should have the highest priority.

Also from the perspective of the city there is a priority argument. The city receives newcomers of all sorts and of different origins who bring with them different cultures, religions and lifestyles. Their integration into the social embroidery of the city is not a natural process: social segregation, social exclusion and marginalization of (certain of these) immigrant groups is luring, threatening the social cohesion in these cities.
If cities have a special *problematique* and a specific responsibility, different from that of the national authorities, at the same time the local city level offers special opportunities. The city and their neighbourhoods are the places where important things happen that affect the daily lives of all residents, including immigrants. It is also the level where loyalty of newcomers and old residents can be gained, or for that matter, lost. So local policies should be given more instruments and room to act in locally adequate ways. National policies, and by implication also European integration policies, should set general frameworks, rules and instruments, primarily facilitating local actors.

In view of this division of tasks and taking into account the political will of the European Commission in the field of EU-integration policies as expressed in the Communication of 2003 and the consent of the Thessaloniki Summit, what could we expect from EU-policies? What special tasks could the EU/EC take on in favour of policies at the national and local level? In my view these can be listed briefly as follows.

A first function (or task) of the EU is *framesetting*. The EC has to frame both (im-)migration and integration, and the nexus between the two, in a different way than is done predominantly at the national level in most EU-countries until now: from defensive and mainly control-centered policy to a pro-active, future-oriented, comprehensive approach to immigration; towards a balanced approach between (realistic) problem-orientation and possible present and future gains of immigration, thus furthering acceptance of immigration; accentuating the necessity of common action in both the immigration and integration domain. The EC is in principle in a position to bent negative competition and “burden shifting” practices among EU-member states towards an approach that focuses on common interests.

The framesetting task is one that should be done in the first place within the political and bureaucratic setting of the EU/EC and between ‘Brussels’ and the national authorities and policy makers, which implies tough and long negotiations. But using Sarah Spencer’s (2003) formulation, the EC/EU should also take “active responsibility for leading a balanced, informed, public debate about the reasons migrants are in Europe by putting into the public domain information about the contribution they make and barriers they experience, acknowledging public fears, and correcting misinformation”. This wider task is of great importance, because it
prepares the ground for policy making in civil society and among the population at large and mobilizes a counterforce against populist anti-immigrant political exploitation.

The two Communications (EC 2000 and 2003) mentioned earlier can be regarded as important first steps in the efforts of the European Commission to set a sound frame for policy action.

A second function or task that follows from framesetting is normsetting. What I mean here is, that the above mentioned general frame should be worked out in a number of norm-setting regulations, directives, or even laws that pinpoint basic starting points for integration policies. Such norms pertain to:

a) The definition of the target group of integration policies. Important normsetting regulations should be developed, among others as to the following questions:

- which immigrants are regarded, at what particular point in time as a resident for whom comprehensive integration policies are applicable? (Here again immigration/admission policies and integration policies should clearly be co-ordinated.)
- how should admission policies distinguish between temporary migrants and long-terms residents, and if migrants are initially admitted temporarily, when does ‘temporariness’ end?
- What status should be accorded to family members and marriage partners of established immigrants?

b) The scope of integration policies. If the ultimate aim would be in principle full access of long-term residents to all public institutions and facilities of the society of settlement then in the course of time a system of norms could be developed systematically (through political negotiation) for the three basic dimensions of citizenship: the socio-economic, the legal-political, and the cultural/religious dimension

c) Anti-discrimination policies. In fact this is the negative corrolary of the positive normsetting under B. It is a necessary element in policies, but it also has severe limitations. I have explained elsewhere (Penninx 2000) in a paper on Social Exclusion, that any anti-discrimination norm assumes a positive normsetting in the first place, against which is being discriminated. Since, and as long as, positive
normsetting differs in national contexts, the practical use of anti-discrimination norms also differs between countries.

Thirdly, apart from framesetting and normsetting discussed above, the EC has in practice instruments to promote activities related to the development of integration policies. Specific budget lines of General Directorates in charge of certain policy domains (Justice and Home Affairs for immigration, asylum and reception of asylum seekers and refugees; Social Affairs and Employment for integration and anti-discrimination) can be used to mobilize forces, for example to set up systems for collecting systematically information (both internally and externally), to have certain policy questions researched externally, etcetera. Also a special fund has been created to involve non-governmental agencies in reception of asylum seekers and refugees (European Refugee Fund). In 2003 a programme to promote integration projects and the dissemination of their good practices was started: the (still) small INTI-programme. It is expected that the INTI-programme will expand significantly in the coming years. The significance of such EC-financing activity for the development of integration policies can be high, if such activities enable local actors in integration policies to develop and implement strategic projects, if succesful pilot projects are analysed and reported systematically, and these results disseminated as examples of good practices.

5. Strategies for local polices

Let me now turn to my last point: some strategic recommendations particularly for development and implementation of local policies. A first important strategy is that of monitoring outcomes both of general public institutions and of specific integration policies. Monitoring is a device for developing awareness, to establish an empirically based diagnosis and thereby an instrument for steering policies. The basic assumption involved here is that the position of newcomers in a society is determined to a great extent by the (mostly unintended) differential impact of general public institutions. Because of the socio-economic status, their immigration-related characteristics, and sometimes their cultural/religious characteristics, the outcomes for immigrants may be unequal. For example higher unemployment and thus (if access is permitted) overrepresentation in social welfare or disabled benefit regulations, as is the case in
the Netherlands; or lower educational attainments of immigrant children; or concentration/segregation through housing policies and regulations. Turning this reasoning around means that monitoring outcomes leads to awareness of the functioning of general public institutions for immigrants, and when the procedures through which the unequal outcomes are scrutinized, it will lead to a clear diagnosis. (On the level of the EU the Annual Report of states (decided at the Thessaloniki Summit in June 2003) is intended to have this same function as an instrument for progressive policy making.

A second important element for local policies is to provide newcomers with basic tools that they need to acquire a place in society independently: a toolkit of training in the language of the society of settlement, basic knowledge of that society, civic training, etc. The basic idea (and the lesson from earlier policies related to temporary migrants and guest workers) here is that immigrants should be given the necessary tools to find a place in the new society; tools that prepare them for full participation. Several countries and cities are developing policies in this field. It is important, however, to look at such efforts as simply facilitating integration processes, and avoid normative claims (making natives of immigrants). Preferably such activities should take place in connection with trajectories for labour market or further education.

A third important feature of sound policies is that they should mobilize resources within immigrant groups for integration policies. Too much policy conception is ‘top-down’, addressing individual immigrants, while much of the policy implementation has to rely on mobilizing forces within immigrant groups to be successful. A number of good examples of using the potential within groups have been developed and are developing: for example mentor-projects of immigrant students who monitor younger co-ethnics during their secondary education; immigrant organizations mobilizing their rank and file for training and language courses, or for labour market projects; participation of women immigrants, etc.

Finally, (local) integration policies should be comprehensive in the dimensions and domains covered, thereby signifying that they do not only represent concern of the native majority, but also build on needs from the perspective of the immigrants. The economic and the social domains, particularly labour market, education, housing and health are priority domains. Policies in the political and cultural domain (including religion), however, are indispensable over the long term for integration. The forms
that such local policies may take depend in practice very much on the existing institutional arrangements in receiving societies and cities, and on the political willingness to change these to become gradually more inclusive.

**Two concluding remarks**

In spite of the ideological differences mentioned earlier, we will find out that – in implementing seriously integration policies - the settlement process itself will act as a force towards convergence of policies, particularly as it presents itself at the local level (See Penninx et al. 2004). Whatever the institutional arrangements may be, local authorities have to find answers to the same questions, such as how to provide immigrants with adequate housing and jobs, but also how to react to their demands to fulfill religious obligations or facilities to use and teach their mother tongues. They also have to deal with very similar reactions of the native population to immigrants, and processes of discrimination and social exclusion.

Secondly, if (local) integration policies will follow strategies and tactics that engage immigrants as partners in the integration process at different levels, if it will combine ‘top down’ activation elements with ‘bottom up’ mobilization, it will automatically define the process of integration as ‘open’, within the rules of liberal-democratic societies, leaving room for a more divers, but cohesive society as a result. The diversity reached in this way is neither predetermined nor static, but negotiated, shared and ever changing.

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