Aegean Plan 2.0 – preventing a disaster in the times of Corona

"Judging by the rapidity with which the disease is spreading, it may well, unless we can stop it, kill off half the town before two months are out … It's not a question of painting too black a picture. It's a question of taking precautions … It may seem a ridiculous idea, but the only way to fight the plague is decency."

Albert Camus, The Plague, 1947

Dear friends,

When attention is scarce, we must get straight to the point: At its external border in Greece the European Union faces the certainty of massive but avoidable human suffering, spiralling into an uncontrollable disaster. Member states that care to prevent it must act. Here is how.

The EU has an interest to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe when the corona virus hits the more than 40,000 refugees and migrants crammed together on Greek islands under dismal conditions, without sufficient medical care or even the option to wash their hands regularly. The EU and Turkey also have a common interest to support more than 3.5 million refugees now in Turkey; to control mobility in the face of the biggest public health crisis in a century; and to provide humanitarian assistance to more than 2 million displaced near the Turkish border in Syria.

Governments across Europe are closing borders and restricting movement: cities, regions, countries are under lock-down. UNHCR and IOM have suspended all humanitarian
resettlement. Public institutions, including asylum services, are closing, from the Netherlands to Greece. There is a strong public health interest to stop movement and ensure social distance to contain the spread of the Corona virus.

This has consequences for refugees, asylum seekers and irregular migrants. One result of recent border closures and measures to restrict mobility is that most of them will not be able to leave the countries where they are now. This creates an even more urgent need to help people where they are, and to support the communities hosting them. And it requires concrete steps:

A renewed EU-Turkey statement 2.0, including a renewed EU commitment to support refugees and communities in Turkey for the next years with substantial financial assistance. At the same time Turkey should reaffirm its commitment to implement the EU-Turkey Statement of March 2016.

A joint plan for the EU and Turkey to provide immediate humanitarian support to displaced people in Idlib in the North-West of Syria.

A transfer of at least 35,000 asylum seekers from the Greek islands to the Greek mainland as a matter of urgency. The humanitarian situation on the islands is catastrophic and a huge threat to the health of Greeks and asylum seekers on Lesbos and the other islands.

To achieve such a transfer will require building new accommodation on the mainland for 20,000 people, i.e. at least ten camps for 2,000 people each. The Greek government, supported by IOM and with EU funding, could do this in two stages: first build tent camps (within the next 10 days); then follow up with more solid accommodation (within months). Add to this the capacity of three camps already under construction by IOM (for 5,000 people) and one arrives at 25,000 places.

So where could 35,000 people be accommodated? This is where leadership by some EU member states becomes crucial. Greece already has more asylum seekers per capita in the country (with 250,000 applications since early 2016) than any other EU member state. But if EU member states would be ready to relocate in the next days 10,000 recognised refugees from the Greek mainland two huge problems would be addressed. The Greek Prime minister could point to real, not just rhetorical, solidarity, as he needs to persuade communities on the mainland to host more camps to relief the islands. And there would be 10,000 additional existing places to accommodate families now on the islands.

To relocate already recognised refugees from the Greek mainland to other EU countries should be straight-forward. Their asylum claims have already been examined and they have been found to deserve protection. 4,000 of them are in existing camps managed by IOM and 6,000 are in apartments, organised by UNHCR, both financed by the European Commission and organized by DG Home.

Such an evacuation will not be easy. Some may say it is politically impossible. European publics have their own anxieties. But if nobody in Europe is prepared to do this it becomes even harder for Greek politicians to transfer people to the mainland now. The Greek mainland already hosts some 70,000 refugees and asylum seekers. Greek leaders and citizens need to know that they are not alone.
To move 35,000 people from the islands to the mainland, building accommodation for 20,000 and relocating 10,000 to other European countries, would be an historic operation: an airlift of humanity.

Do EU members have the capacity to do this? Yes, they do. In the coming days they will bring home more than 100,000 of their citizens stuck somewhere outside the EU. In late February 2011 Turkey evacuated 5,000 people from Libya in 72 hours and a total of 15,000 people within a few days, while Greek ships evacuated 15,000 Chinese from Tripoli at the time of the 2011 turmoil there. Germany has just announced that it might bring back 20,000 Germans from Egypt over the weekend.

It is a matter of will and leadership to make the extra effort. Germany could set an example and bring 5,000 recognised refugees from the Greek mainland to Germany. Other countries should join this effort. Containing a deadly virus, and preventing dangerous tensions leading to a social explosion on Greek islands, is a pan-European interest.

The alternative to decisive action: courting disaster

The alternative to acting now is too terrible to contemplate: Tens of thousands of people on small islands, 20,000 alone on Lesbos, with completely inadequate health infrastructure, under abysmal conditions, without support. Add to this panic among migrants and refugees, fear among islanders, lack of security, all against the background of a deadly pandemic: this is a recipe for a humanitarian disaster. The atmosphere on the islands is already explosive. Greece and the whole EU have an interest – moral, political and public health – to pre-empt an explosion.

Do EU member states have a legal obligation to help Greece? They could look away. Some probably will. But it is at moments like this that states, societies, citizens and their leaders show who they want to be. It is a matter of defining, under pressure, who they truly are.

Danes and Swedes were ready to rescue more than 7,000 Danish Jews by moving them quickly across the Baltic sea in October 1943. Hans Hedoft, at the time a member of the resistance and later Denmark's Social Democratic prime minister, as well as Swedish officials, helped make this possible. They are, rightly, still remembered. Who will be remembered of this generation, and what for?
There is one huge difference to the 1940s, of course: in the current crisis the enemy is a virus, not an army. If the fight against this virus is defined as a "war" (French president Emanuel Macron) then the type of rescue effort needed now is what societies will remember generations later. It is at moments like this that heroic history is made. Or disasters unfold.

**MSF: Evacuation of camps on islands more urgent than ever**

"It would be impossible to contain an outbreak in such camp settings in Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Leros and Kos. To this day we have not seen a credible emergency plan to protect and treat people living there in case of an outbreak."

_Hilde Vochten, MSF Medical Coordinator, Greece_

**Aegean Plan: Europe's biggest success – and its failure**

Exactly four years ago, on 20 March 2016, the implementation of the so-called the EU-Turkey agreement, began. So did the confusion surrounding it, which meant that Marine Le Pen and Amnesty International, the AfD and Pro Asyl all opposed it.

In fact, this "agreement" is no more than a press statement. It is no legal text. It changes no existing international or EU laws. Its effectiveness relied from the very beginning on one thing
only: that both sides – the EU and Turkey - would act as they promised, because of their own interests. When one of the two partners no longer sees an interest in cooperation, the statement would vanish. And yet, it worked for four years.

Strikingly this EU-Turkey Statement turned into the most effective expression of moral realism in EU migration management in the past four years. It had a dramatic impact. It sharply reduced irregular migration across its South-eastern external borders without undermining the individual right to asylum. It sharply reduced numbers of deaths in the Aegean. It helped millions of refugees in Turkey gain access to education and health care. At the same time, it was never properly implemented on the Greek islands, not because this was not possible – what needed to be done was obvious already before it was adopted in March 2016 – but because the success in reducing numbers of arrivals meant that both the EU and the previous Greek government in Athens no longer paid much attention to its implementation on the islands. This came at the expense of asylum seekers and the Greek islands. And this has now come back to haunt Greece.

ARD interview in March 2020

Given how short the statement is it is striking how often it has been discussed without apparently having been read. Here is a reminder of what it says, which matters to what should happen now:

"Return of those not in need of international protection"

"Turkey furthermore agreed to accept the rapid return of all migrants not in need of international protection crossing from Turkey into Greece and to take back all irregular migrants intercepted in Turkish waters." (Statement)

This means that only migrants not in need of receiving international protection in the EU will be returned to Turkey. Also, interception is only possible in Turkish, not in Greek, waters.
"In full accordance with EU law"

How to determine, who is in need of international protection? The statement is unambiguous:

"All new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into Greek islands as from 20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey. This will take place in full accordance with EU and international law, thus excluding any kind of collective expulsion." (Statement)

Note: those, who crossed to Greece before 20 March 2016, were not to be returned. Only those who cross to the Greek islands – not across the land border – were to be returned. And anybody who applied for asylum would see his or her claim assessed in accordance with existing Greek, EU (Asylum Procedures Directive) and international law:

"Migrants arriving in the Greek islands will be duly registered and any application for asylum will be processed individually by the Greek authorities in accordance with the Asylum Procedures Directive, in cooperation with UNHCR.”

"Cooperation on border controls"

Turkey, the country with most refugees in the world then and now, not only accepted to take back people from the Greek islands in order to reduce arrivals across this dangerous route. It also promised to cooperate in other ways:

"Turkey will take any necessary measures to prevent new sea or land routes for illegal migration opening from Turkey to the EU and will cooperate with neighbouring states as well as the EU to this effect.”

"Unprecedented support to refugees in Turkey – disbursed quickly"

Why did Turkey propose this cooperation to the European Union in March 2016? Turkey asked for 6 billion Euro in assistance for refugees in Turkey, to be spent in two tranches, with a focus on health, education, infrastructure and living costs. The statement insists on the speed of disbursements:

"The EU, in close cooperation with Turkey, will further speed up the disbursement of the initially allocated 3 billion euros under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey and ensure funding of further projects for persons under temporary protection identified with swift input from Turkey before the end of March. A first list of concrete projects for refugees, notably in the field of health, education, infrastructure, food and other living costs, that can be swiftly financed from the Facility, will be jointly identified within a week. Once these resources are about to be used to the full, and provided the above commitments are met, the EU will mobilise additional funding for the Facility of an additional 3 billion euro up to the end of 2018.” (Statement)

6 billion Euro: this is the single biggest amount of money the EU has ever spent in a third country for refugees. It is more money than the total funds available for UNHCR's global operations in 2018, 4.7 billion USD (4 billion Euro). It is close to the budget of Istanbul in 2018 – some 7.5 billion Euro – for its 15 million inhabitants.

(Note that Germany alone spent 20 billion Euros on 1 million asylum seekers arriving in 2016. Turkey today hosts more than 3.5 million Syrian refugees, three times more Syrians than the whole EU taken together).
Regular reports by the European Commission show the impact of the money (European Commission, EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey). As of March 2020, EU money is funding every month 18 Euro in social welfare support on debit cards for 1.7 million refugees, which helps cover their basic needs. It finances 173 migrant health centres with over 2,900 employees, having provided over 9 million primary healthcare consultations and vaccinated 650,000 refugee infants. It has also helped construct new hospitals. As of March 2020, 180 new schools were built, and 4,000 Turkish language teachers were employed to teach 230,000 children. 685,000 refugee children went to Turkish schools in 2018/2019. Half a million received financial support to go to school. 179,000 children benefit from school transportation.

This has been a project the European Commission should rightly take pride in. It was the most meaningful cooperation between Turkey and the EU in recent years. And it was a major mistake of the European Union not to make clear before all 6 billion were assigned to projects at the end of 2019, as foreseen, that the EU would be ready to continue to help Turkey in a similar way in the coming years.

In addition, restating the objectives of the 2016 Statement is a way to restate a commitment to the UN Refugee Convention and to the right to asylum.

**Why EU assistance to refugees in Turkey must continue**

Did the EU keep its promises? It depends how one looks at it. By end of 2019 all 6 billion Euro were assigned to projects. However, so far only 3.2 billion Euro were spent, as a lot of money will only be given after a project is completed.

European Commission, 31 December 2019,
"List of Projects Committed/Decided, Contracted, Distributed."

In Turkey today 4 percent of the population are refugees. This is a population as big as that of Berlin, requiring health care, social support, infrastructure, and who will remain in Turkey for the foreseeable future. It is a young population: to provide access to education is crucial in order not to create a lost generation.
The number of Syrians in Turkey keeps growing. The most important reason is births. An estimated 100,000 refugee babies are born every year in Turkey. All of this does not yet consider the possibility of many more refugees arriving from Syria's Idlib region, where more than 2 million people have been pushed into a small area, and where Syrian and Russian forces have for months bombed even hospitals.

To put Turkey's integration challenge in context, think of Denmark. Denmark has a population of 5 million, so 4 percent of the population would be 200,000 refugees.

Imagine this scenario: Germany, many times the size of Denmark, asks its neighbour to ensure that no refugees move on, promising in return to support the integration of refugees in Denmark. Then, after four years, with another 100,000 refugees already massed on the Danish border, German assistance runs out and is not replaced. Would Berlin be expecting a reaction from Copenhagen? What would Danish politics look like?

It should be obvious that continuing to support Syrians in Turkey generously is a win-win-win policy. It is good for these refugees; it is important for Turkey and Turkish citizens; and it helps the EU since it enables refugees to build a life in Turkey and not to move to the EU. And it is working. In 2019 only 16,366 Syrians left Turkey and arrived in Greece. This means that 99.5 percent of Syrians remained in Turkey.

Outline of EU-Turkey Statement 2.0

What could an EU-Turkey statement 2.0 look like? There are things that both Turkey and Greece would like to renegotiate. Given the dramatic situation produced by the Corona crisis, however, it would be best to find a quick agreement that addresses the most urgent needs, and to revisit the statement in a few months in the summer for further debates.

A renewed statement should include:

- Clarity: EU and Turkey remain committed to the goals of the 18 March 2016 statement.
- An EU commitment to mobilise another 6 billion Euro for refugees in Turkey in the next years, to be spent in ways that would also allow vulnerable Turks to benefit from support for health and social assistance in the communities where refugees live. Turkish public finances and the health system are likely to come under huge pressure soon.
Scrapping the 1:1 provision in the 2016 Statement (under which EU countries were to resettle only as many Syrians as people are returned from Greece to Turkey) and formally activating the "Voluntary Humanitarian Admissions Scheme" of resettlement from Turkey (Point 4 of the 2016 Statement), on the understanding that this will take place from the moment the Corona crisis is overcome. The 1:1 provision has never, rightly, been adhered to: there have been some 25,000 resettlements to EU countries and only around 2,000 returns to Turkey.

A commitment by the EU to exert pressure on Russia, including a threat of sanctions, to stick to the current cease-fire in Idlib, which should allow joint humanitarian support by the EU and Turkey to reach the displaced there.

A new cut-off date for returns from Greece to Turkey. Those now in Greece will not be returned. Anyone arriving in Greece after the date of the new statement may be returned to Turkey in line with the provisions of the 2016 Statement. However, at this moment neither asylum procedures nor returns might be possible due to the Corona virus; during this time, Greece, Turkey and Frontex must cooperate to discourage all irregular arrivals through the Aegean, as lock-downs reach ever more communities.

Further support to local communities hosting refugees and migrants in Greece. If the EU can fund building new clinics and hospitals in Turkey, why not do so also on the islands and the mainland?

Such a statement should be concluded within the next days, following up on recent discussions EU leaders have already had with President Erdogan.

**Helping Greece**

*Can German and Greek leaders cooperate to preserve humane control? And save lives and the refugee convention?*

A new EU-Turkey statement is also vital for Greece and the situation on the islands. In the years since the EU-Turkey statement the number of people who crossed to the Aegean islands fell dramatically from 1 million people who reached the islands in the year before the March 2016 EU-Turkey Statement:
Arrivals from Turkey to the Greek islands after March 2016:

- In 2016: 21,998
- In 2017: 29,718
- In 2018: 32,494
- In 2019: 59,726

In the first months of 2020 the number of arrivals via the Aegean was nonetheless higher than during the same period in any of the past three years. While the corona threat has currently reduced crossings, numbers will rise again after the crisis. And without cooperation with Turkey there will be nothing that Greece can do to reduce these arrivals. No additional 10,000 European border guards, no imaginary wall on the water will achieve this. Only cooperation can.

At the same time, without support from the EU, Turkey will have huge problems taking care of the biggest refugee population in any country in the world. This truly is a matter of common interest. It takes real leadership to act in a time of global crisis in ways that both defend the national interest of keeping citizens safe and preserve the dignity of the most vulnerable. This is what historians will seize upon when they identify exceptional politicians.

Many best regards,

Gerald Knaus
EU-Turkey Statement: majorities in all German parties in favour except for Left party and, especially, the far-right AfD (poll March 2020)

Debate in ZDF with former foreign minister Sigmar Gabriel – Markus Lanz (March 2020)

More from this debate

Core facts about the EU-Turkey Statement (2016-2020)

There are many facts, and a concrete proposal how to improve the EU-Turkey Statement, in this paper from January 2020:

ESI Paper
The Aegean Tragedy
Key facts and key steps
January 2020

www.esiweb.org
Myth 1: the 2016 Statement had no real impact on arrivals

In the 12 months before 1 April 2016:

- **1 million** arrived on the Aegean islands
- **1,152** drowned in the Aegean

In the 12 months after 1 April 2016:

- **26,000** arrived on the Aegean islands
- **81** drowned in the Aegean

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Sea arrivals in Greece per month until 15 March 2020 (UNHCR)

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<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>1,694</td>
<td>67,415</td>
<td>1,393</td>
<td>1,633</td>
<td>1,851</td>
<td>3,136</td>
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<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>1,001</td>
<td>2,873</td>
<td>57,066</td>
<td>1,089</td>
<td>1,256</td>
<td>1,486</td>
<td>2,067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>1,501</td>
<td>7,874</td>
<td>26,971</td>
<td>1,526</td>
<td>2,441</td>
<td>1,904</td>
<td>2,069</td>
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<td>April</td>
<td>1,257</td>
<td>13,556</td>
<td>3,650</td>
<td>1,156</td>
<td>3,032</td>
<td>1,856</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>1,703</td>
<td>17,889</td>
<td>1,721</td>
<td>2,110</td>
<td>2,916</td>
<td>2,651</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>3,198</td>
<td>31,318</td>
<td>1,554</td>
<td>2,012</td>
<td>2,439</td>
<td>3,122</td>
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<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>3,927</td>
<td>54,899</td>
<td>1,920</td>
<td>2,249</td>
<td>2,545</td>
<td>5,008</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>6,742</td>
<td>107,843</td>
<td>3,447</td>
<td>3,584</td>
<td>3,197</td>
<td>7,712</td>
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<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>7,454</td>
<td>147,123</td>
<td>3,080</td>
<td>4,886</td>
<td>3,960</td>
<td>10,551</td>
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<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>7,432</td>
<td>211,663</td>
<td>2,970</td>
<td>4,134</td>
<td>4,073</td>
<td>8,996</td>
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<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>3,812</td>
<td>151,249</td>
<td>1,991</td>
<td>3,215</td>
<td>2,075</td>
<td>8,426</td>
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<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>2,056</td>
<td>108,742</td>
<td>1,665</td>
<td>2,364</td>
<td>2,927</td>
<td>6,163</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>41,038</strong></td>
<td><strong>856,723</strong></td>
<td><strong>173,450</strong></td>
<td><strong>29,718</strong></td>
<td><strong>32,494</strong></td>
<td><strong>59,726</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,272</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Myth 2: Greece can reduce arrivals alone with more border guards and determination

The main way for asylum seekers to reach Greece and the EU has always been across the sea. This was true in 2015, in 2019 and it is true now. In the first months of 2020 more people arrived already than in the same period in any year since the EU-Turkey statement. It is only through cooperation with Turkey that this can be reduced.

Myth 3: the EU-Turkey statement undermined the right to apply for asylum

The contrary is true. It was the end of the statement, following Turkey's declarations on 29 February 2020 that its borders to EU member states are open, that led to the suspension of the right to apply for asylum in Greece. The statement is explicit and clear: anybody arriving has the right to an individual assessment in line with EU law and the principle of non-refoulement.

Myth 4: the EU-Turkey statement de facto undermined the possibility to apply for asylum

This is also obviously false. Without the reduction in the numbers of arrivals in March 2016 there was never any chance for those reaching Greece to apply for asylum: the numbers alone made it impossible.
In a paper (published by Forced Migration Review) in January 2016 Maria Stavropoulou, then the director of the Greek asylum service, wrote that:

"case workers can reasonably be expected to issue no more than a few dozen decisions a month … in a situation, however, where thousands of people arrive every day in a country … these requirements are simply impossible to meet. For instance, the Greek Asylum Service can currently process at most 1,500 applications a month if it wishes to respect all of these requirements – which is less than half of the average daily inflow of refugees on the Greek islands at the time of writing this article."

The dramatic shortage of resources meant that for all practical purposes the right to an individual review of asylum applications had already vanished for the vast majority of those who arrived in Greece in early 2016. In three months in winter (December-February 2016), some 230,000 people arrived in Greece from Turkey. At a rate of processing 1,500 applications a month, such a number would take more than twelve years to process if there were no more arrivals.

**Myth 5: relocation from Greece to EU countries must lead to a pull effect**

This was not true when relocation from Greece picked up, following the conclusion of the EU-Turkey Statement, between April 2016 to September 2017.

This relocation targeted asylum seekers "in clear need of international protection" (EU recognition rate of at least 75 percent).

**Asylum seekers relocated from Greece**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Receiving state</th>
<th>Relocated</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>5,391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>4,394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1,755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1,656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1,202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1,124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1,022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Relocations from Greece started on 4 November 2015 with 30 asylum seekers from Syria and Iraq travelling to Luxembourg. Until March 2016, when the EU-Turkey Statement was concluded, the figure of relocated asylum seekers reached 600. During the first year of the EU-Turkey Statement, close to 10,000 people were relocated, and in 2017 it was another 11,700. Governments were willing to do this as they saw that there was no pull-effect.

This was also the period of the lowest number of arrivals in Greece, following the conclusion of the EU-Turkey Statement.

European Commission, "Member states' support to Emergency Relocation Mechanism", accessed 2 October 2019.

Relocation from Greece to other EU member states

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cumulative number</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 Nov. 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Dec. 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Jan. 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 March 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Dec. 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Jan. 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 March 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Dec. 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 March 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End-March 2018</td>
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ESI advocacy for humane borders in the Aegean

Briefing Prime minister Armin Laschet and the state cabinet of NRW (March 2020)

Discussing ideas for Europe's border and asylum in the Bundestag: SPD and FDP members

Interview (in German): ZDF news

www.esiweb.org
Debate (in German) with CDU party secretary Paul Ziemiak and Green Party leader Annalena Baerbock - What to do now?
Selected recent interviews and debates

DIE ZEIT
Griechische Grenze - Chance oder Schande?
18 March 2020

Bayern 2
Scheitert Europa an der Flüchtlingsfrage?
18 March 2020

Die Welt
"Auch 10.000 Grenzschützer mehr helfen nicht"
18 March 2020

SWR 2
Grenzgeschacher – Europa, Erdogan und die Flüchtlinge
17 March 2020

Dagens ETC
Orbáns flyktingpolitik håller på att segra i unionen
09 March 2020

Barfuss
Griechisches Flüchtlingsdrama: Was kommt als nächstes?
09 March 2020

Telma
Опасни времења идат поради мигрантскиот пат кон запад, решение е помош за Сиријците избегани во Турција
09 March 2

Buitenhof
Nieuwe migrantencrisis in Griekenland
08 March 2020

Der Spiegel
'Illner'-Talk zu Flüchtlingen und Erdogan: Es geht um Menschen
06 March 2020

NRC Handelsblad
Interview: 'Van afpersing EU door Turkije is geen sprake'
05 March 2020

ZDF
Erdogan und die Flüchtlinge – Erpressung oder Notwehr?
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