A Green Foreign Ministry?
It was not clear at the time just how important a debate within the German Green party would become to European politics later. As Paul Hockenos writes, the Greens at the time appeared unlikely to ever be at the helm of German foreign policy:
In the early 1990s, neither within the Social Democrats nor the Greens had there been talk of a Greens-held foreign ministry, should a "red-green" coalition in fact come to power. The Greens' clear priority was the environment ministry. The Social Democrats swore to strategic allies that the anti-NATO environmentalists would not get close to the Auswärtiges Amt. In official trips to Washington, Greens foreign affairs expert Helmut Lippelt calmed U.S. policymakers: "I'd go through Congress or to the State Department and say that it is very, very clear to us that we are just a little pacifist party and that we won't have any influence on foreign policy. We'll never have the foreign or defense ministry portfolios, I'd say."
The issue arises when examining the metamorphosis of the Greens' foreign policies. Fischer's critics argue that he forced the party's hand to disavow its antimilitarist roots in order to prep it for prime time: a nationwide red-green coalition with himself as foreign minister. Fischer's centrality in pushing the Greens toward the mainstream on foreign policy is undisputed. But there is more to the story than ambition run rampant.
During the first half of the 1990s, the Greens as a whole grappled poorly with the epochal geopolitical shifts that were transforming the world around them. The Cold War-era party was out of step with the new realities of the post-Cold War world, which demanded a rethinking of once-fixed assumptions and flexible, creative responses to new problems. Instead, too many Greens clung to their pacifist credo despite the slaughter in Bosnia and they remained adamant that their nemeses of old