Publications

Daha önce hiçbir AB üyesi devlet, mahkemelerini yürütmenin denetimine Polonya hükûmeti kadar sokmadı. Polonya örneği, bir AB üyesi ülkede Sovyet tarzı bir yargı düzeni, yani mahkemelerin, savcıların ve hâkimlerin üzerinde denetimin yürütmeye ve tek bir partiye verildiği bir düzenin kurulup kurulamayacağının adeta bir denemesi.

The EU, and Italy especially, remains a magnet, as almost nobody who arrives is ever returned, regardless of the decisions of asylum bodies. The political debate returns like a pendulum to earlier experiences of agreements with North African states (Tunisia and Libya) as the only way to stop boats arriving.

Dal momento che i rimpatri sono di fatto inesistenti, indipendentemente dagli esiti delle decisioni in merito alle domande d’asilo, l’UE, e in particolare l’Italia, agisce come una grande calamita. Gli accordi con stati nordafricani (Tunisia e Libia) sono visti come l’unica soluzione possibile per fermare gli arrivi.

Bosnian democracy is safe. This should have been obvious all along. But then again, many obvious things have often been obscured when it comes to the work of Bosnian institutions. On this, as one previous occasions, the rational approach is the same: don't believe the hype. Bosnian democracy will not end in October.

The challenge for Greek and EU policy makers is clear: to ensure humane reception conditions in line with EU standards for every asylum seeker and migrant who arrives on the islands. If the average time people spend on the islands were 2 months only, and arrivals were below 3,000 a month, the accommodation capacity needed on all islands would be 6,000.

Leaders across the EU are looking for a fast, effective and humane asylum system; a system which determines quickly, but thoroughly, who needs protection; creates disincentives for people to get into boats; and manages to return those who are found not to need protection within a short period of time.

Così come il presidente francese Emmanuel Macron, anche altri leader dell’Unione Europea sono alla ricerca di un sistema d’asilo veloce, efficiente e che rispetti pienamente i diritti dei richiedenti asilo. Questo sistema deve poter determinare in modo rapido e preciso chi ha bisogno di protezione, deve creare un effetto deterrente verso coloro che si vogliono avventurare su un barcone e, infine, deve permettere di rimpatriare nel più breve tempo possibile chi non ottiene asilo.

Bosanskohercegovački političari trebaju postići da sistem koji imaju bolje funkcionira. Ovo zahtijeva da ostave po strani polazni kliše o kome smo ovdje govorili: da u BiH nacionalna i religiozna mržnja godinama raste; da je politika trula; i da Ustav predstavlja nepremostivu prepreku za bilo kakav napredak. Izbori u BiH su, zapravo, važni. Nove stranke često uspjevaju ući u skupštine. Kantonalne i lokalne politike su također važne, obzirom koliko se toga se odlučuje na tom nivou. Trebalo bi biti moguće napraviti reformske koalicije na različitim nivoima vlasti i fokusirati se na ono što treba biti promjenjeno tamo, od Grada Doboja do Grada Sarajeva, od Tuzlanskog Kantona do Brčko Distrikta. Ni nacionalna raznolikost ni federalizam u BiH nisu izgovor za neaktivnost kad se radi o reformama. Bosanskohercegovačko društvo ima ozbiljne probleme, ali oni nisu jedinstveni. Sličnu sudbinu imaju i susjedne države na Balkanu, ali i sva demokratska društva, starija i novija.

Bosnian leaders need to make the system they have work better. This requires setting aside the main clichés discussed here: that in Bosnia ethnic and religious hate has been growing for years; that politics is rotten; and that the constitution poses an insurmountable obstacle to any progress. In fact, Bosnian elections matter. New parties are often successful at entering assemblies. Cantonal and local politics matter, too, given how much is decided at this level. It should be possible to form reform coalitions at different levels of the state and to focus on what needs to be reformed there, from Doboj municipality to Sarajevo city, from Tuzla Canton to Brcko district. Neither ethnic diversity nor Bosnian federalism are excuses for inaction when it comes to reforms. Bosnian society faces serious problems, but this does not make it unique. It is the common fate shared with its Balkan neighbours and indeed with all democracies, young and old.

For Turkey to reintroduce the death penalty – the last execution took place in 1984 – would constitute a serious setback in the global struggle against capital punishment. Europeans should take the threat of the return of capital punishment in Turkey seriously. The EU and the Council of Europe should take every step they can, in time, to make this as unlikely as possible – in Turkey and anywhere else in Europe.

Both Turkey and the EU need to find a framework where sensitive issues can be discussed fruitfully. A reformed accession process provides such a framework. The key to such a process is clarity: it needs to be clear what EU standards are, how far Turkey is from meeting them and why it is useful for both sides to remain engaged in a dialogue on this. The EU needs a policy that is understood before it can have one that might be transformative.

The EU-Turkey refugee agreement reached on 18 March 2016 has had a dramatic impact on refugee movements in the Eastern Mediterranean. It has sharply reduced irregular crossings from Turkey to Greece and, with this, the number of people who drown on this dangerous journey. If the EU-Turkey agreement is implemented in full, it will demonstrate that it is possible to control borders and at the same time respect the UN Refugee Convention, combining compassion and empathy with control and security concerns.

Can basic international norms be undermined by corruption? Can international politics be fundamentally reshaped by the personal greed of politicians? These are among the most important questions in global politics today. When it comes to the Council of Europe, guardian of the European Convention of Human Rights and, since its creation in 1949, the leading intergovernmental human rights institution in the world, the answer to both questions is yes.

Temel uluslararası normları yolsuzluk vasıtasıyla işlevsiz kılmak mümkün mü? Uluslararası siyaset siyasetçilerin şahsî hırslarına göre baştan aşağı yeniden şekillendirilebilir mi? Bu iki soru günümüzde küresel çapta siyasetin yanıt bulmaya çalıştığı en önemli sorular arasında. Ancak "evet" cevabı veren bir kurum özellikle dikkat çekiyor: Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi'nin koruyucusu ve –kurulduğu 1949 yılından bu yana- dünyanın en önde gelen hükûmetlerarası insan hakları kuruluşu olan Avrupa Konseyi.

Kann Korruption grundlegende internationale Normen untergraben? Kann die Habgier von Politikern internationale Politik fundamental umgestalten? Dies sind heute zwei der wichtigsten weltpolitischen Fragen. Für den Europarat, den Hüter der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention und seit seiner Gründung 1949 die weltweit führende zwischenstaatliche Menschenrechtsinstitution, lautet die Antwort auf beide Fragen ja.

¿Puede la corrupción socavar normas básicas internacionales? ¿Puede la avaricia personal de los políticos remodelar la base de la política internacional? Éstas son las preguntas más importantes sobre la política mundial actual. Para el Consejo de Europa, protector de la Convención Europea de Derechos Humanos y, desde su creación en 1949, la institución intergubernamental de derechos humanos más destacada en el mundo, la respuesta es "sí".

Eylül raporu daha derin bir incelemeye tâbi tutulduğunda AB-Türkiye Anlaşması’nın ne kadar kırılganlaştığını, belirginleşmiş sorunları aşarak anlaşmanın doğru uygulanmasını sağlamak adına ne kadar az kafa yorulduğunu görmek mümkün. Ezcümle, uygulama ve iletişim noktalarında şu ana kadar yapılanlar son derece yetersiz.

So what is to be done? ESI has made three concrete proposals in recent months. The EU should create conditions that allow sending a strong asylum support mission to Greece with at least 200 case workers. The EU, in cooperation with UNHCR, should create a mechanism of verification for everyone returned to Turkey; spell out precisely and publicly what Turkey would need to do to be a safe third country for all non-Syrians to be returned from Greece; and make this the key condition for visa liberalisation before the end of the year. The EU should appoint a senior special representative for the implementation of the EU Turkey agreement – a former prime minister or foreign minister, with the experience and authority to address urgent implementation issues on the ground and to communicate clearly with different audiences, from the citizens on Greek islands to the Turkish public, from human rights organisations and the media to prime ministers across the EU.

This paper has one simple purpose: it is an appeal to European institutions to improve their reporting on what is actually happening on Lesbos, Chios, and other Greek islands. The information that is needed to assess the implementation of the EU-Turkey agreement is straightforward and should be presented in a weekly update. The fact that this does not exist yet is troubling. It raises the possibility that European institutions do not have this information. It also suggests that the implementation of the EU-Turkey agreement is not proceeding as foreseen, and that the EU support mission to Greece resembles a vessel sailing in the dark, without instruments, without a captain, which might hit a rock at any moment.