Interview in Der Spiegel on safe third countries and migration control in the English Channel

Is Germany the better Rwanda, Mr Knaus?

German original: Ist Deutschland das bessere Ruanda, Herr Knaus?

7 August 2024

The new British Prime Minister Keir Starmer wants to close the refugee route across the English Channel even without an agreement with Rwanda. Migration expert Gerald Knaus has a proposal and advises the Federal Chancellor to strike a deal.

SPIEGEL: Mr Knaus, the new British Prime Minister Keir Starmer wants to put an end to irregular migration across the English Channel. But he has cancelled the deportation agreement with Rwanda. You are now making a new proposal. What does it look like?

Knaus: A group of EU countries should take in every asylum seeker who reaches the UK across the English Channel from a cut-off date. In return, the UK will take a set number of asylum seekers or refugees from these EU countries for four years – for example, 10,000 people per year. Anyone from the EU who wants to go there can apply. Anyone who gets on a rubber dinghy is sent back. In one fell swoop, there would no longer be any incentive to cross the English Channel. The smugglers’ business model would be gone immediately.

SPIEGEL: You also personally presented this proposal to diplomats and Labour staffers in London. What was the reaction?

Knaus: There were many unofficial talks, but there is a certain openness. Starmer has the chance to regain control. And he can prove that this is possible without withdrawing from the European Convention on Human Rights, as some Conservatives are loudly demanding. The most important question for the British, however, is whether European countries can be found to join in.

SPIEGEL: Is there such a thing? The EU states can’t even manage to establish a real distribution mechanism among themselves. And the French government has already waved goodbye.

Knaus: It doesn’t have to be France just because the asylum seekers leave from the French coast. The main thing is that the third country is safe for refugees. As long as the courts have no doubts about this, the procedures and transfers can be completed very quickly.

“Olaf Scholz could prove that humane border control is possible.”

SPIEGEL: Which EU countries do you have in mind specifically?

Knaus: Germany, Denmark and Spain could lead the way. Perhaps Austria will also follow suit after the elections in September. It’s about countries where governments in the centre have an interest in tackling the issue of irregular migration pragmatically so that right-wing populists don’t continue to benefit – like Nigel Farage in the UK today. The racist violence we are seeing there right now is frightening. It shows how important it is for governments to counter populists with their own concepts.

SPIEGEL: Germany of all countries, which already takes in more asylum seekers than most other EU countries, is now supposed to be the better Rwanda?

Knaus: The coalition government, the Chancellery, and the Ministry of the Interior rightly declare that humane border control that reduces irregular migration is possible. Now Olaf Scholz could prove this – and turn the cooperation in the English Channel into a model project, a role model for other deadly borders in the Mediterranean. That would be a breakthrough that would also immediately relieve the burden on Germany itself.

SPIEGEL: In what way? You’ll have to explain that.

Knaus: The core idea behind agreements with safe third countries is that a small number of consistent transfers from a certain date have a major effect. If the plan works, after two months, no one will cross the English Channel in a boat. Germany would have taken in a few hundred, at most a few thousand people during this time, after which it would be over. However, the UK’s pledge would apply for several years. London would take in thousands of refugees or asylum seekers from Germany every year, without risking their lives. That would be European solidarity in the interests of all.

SPIEGEL: British Prime Minister Keir Starmer has already announced that he wants to work more closely with EU countries. However, only in the prosecution of people smugglers. Even before the racist riots in England, voluntarily accepting refugees from the EU apparently seemed too risky to him.

Knaus: Intensifying the fight against smugglers will not work. We know this because the Tories have been focussing on this for years. London has already sent hundreds of millions of euros to Paris, funding the French police, so to speak, who are supposed to hunt down people smugglers in return. But this is a Sisyphean task. Those who are stopped simply try again. Those who get through once stay in the UK. This is exactly the kind of agreement that Europe is currently concluding with North African countries. They don’t work. Determination alone is not enough. A strategy is also needed.

SPIEGEL: You have long vehemently defended the British Rwanda Plan, which is based on a similar assumption: Once asylum seekers realise they can’t stay, no one will come. That has demonstrably not worked. Why should it work this time?

Knaus: The Tories themselves ruined the Rwanda agreement: they announced a deadline of 2022 and then nothing happened because they couldn’t convince British courts that there were fair asylum procedures in Rwanda. Safe third countries must also be safe from the perspective of European courts, otherwise this policy will fail. So there was not one deportation flight and of course no effect. In the case of the EU-Turkey agreement, which set a cut-off date in March 2016, the number of arrivals fell to three per cent in a short space of time, as did the number of deaths in the Aegean. This is exactly what is now needed in the English Channel.

“Global refugee protection is hanging by a thread.”

SPIEGEL: Wouldn’t your new proposal also fail in court?

Knaus: No. No court doubts that Germany or Denmark are safe third countries. In the end, it’s about an implementable vision: how can we reduce irregular migration worldwide in a humane way and open legal routes? This is the Canadian model. Last year, Canada tightened its third-country agreement with the US. Anyone who crosses the border irregularly from the south is sent back. At the same time, Canada accepts around 50,000 people seeking protection each year in a controlled manner.

SPIEGEL: Donald Trump could come to power in the US in January. If he is elected, he has announced the biggest wave of deportations in history. What would that mean for global refugee protection?

Knaus: It’s hanging by a thread. It is not a foregone conclusion that global refugee protection will survive another Trump presidency. That is why it is so important that heads of government like Starmer and Scholz, who are not indifferent to international norms, now show that they can achieve better results in a pragmatic way. In the end, they need to have the political courage to just go for it.

Recommended reading

ES report: A Channel Plan for London, Berlin and Copenhagen (5 July 2024)

ESI: Opinion on migration agreements with safe third countries (June 2024)

ESI report: A wise court – Rwanda, Safe Third Countries and a Channel breakthrough in 2023 (30 June 2023)

ESI Newsletter: Safe Third Countries, Rwanda and a Channel deal (30 June 2023)

Stellungnahme zu Migrationsabkommen mit sicheren Drittstaaten

Frage: “Ob die Feststellung des Schutzstatus von Geflüchteten unter Achtung der Genfer Flüchtlingskonvention und der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention zukünftig auch in Transit- oder Drittstaaten erfolgen kann?”

Antwort: “Ja.”  

Die vollständige Stellungnahme liegt als PDF vor.

English translation: Statement on migration agreements with safe third countries

Dies ist ein Moment, in dem weltweit, auch in der EU, illegale Pushbacks an Grenzen zunehmend normalisiert werden. Radikale Parteien versprechen, Migration durch das Ignorieren und Aussetzen grundlegender Menschenrechte von Asylsuchenden und Migranten mit Gewalt zu reduzieren. Diese Stellungnahme beschreibt eine alternative Strategie für die seit Jahren tödlichsten Grenzen der Welt, die Außengrenze der EU, die es Parteien der politischen Mitte ermöglichen soll, Extremisten entgegenzutreten. Es geht darum, weder das Versprechen, irreguläre Migration zu reduzieren, noch die gültigen Menschenrechtskonventionen, die Rechtsstaatlichkeit und das seit 1949 bestehende Asylsystem zu opfern.

Dafür braucht es mehr als Rhetorik. Es braucht mehr als Empathie. Es braucht eine Strategie, die mehrheitsfähig und umsetzbar ist. Sichere Drittstaaten sind der Schüssel für eine humane Kontrolle lebensgefährlicher Außengrenzen. Sie können dazu beitragen, irreguläre Migration drastisch zu reduzieren. Sie können somit Tausende Leben retten. Aber das ist nur möglich, wenn klar ist, was diese Strategie leisten und was sie nicht leisten kann und welche Voraussetzungen und welche Vorbereitungen notwendig sind. Da jeder Schritt bei diesem grundlegenden Paradigmenwechsel Zeit und Aufwand erfordert, sollten die notwendigen Schritte so schnell wie möglich eingeleitet werden. Die Idee schneller Abschiebungen ab einem Stichtag aus den Grenzstaaten der EU in sichere Drittstaaten zur effektiven Entmutigung zukünftiger irregulärer Migration bei starken Interessen aller Beteiligten an einer langfristig erfolgreichen Umsetzung muss im Zentrum konkreter Planungen stehen.

Für den Erfolg solcher Abkommen braucht es:

1. Sichere Drittstaaten, die fähig und willens sind, die rechtlichen Standards zu erfüllen; und

2. EU-Staaten, die in der Lage sind, schnell und rechtmäßig zu entscheiden, wer in einen Drittstaat abgeschoben werden kann.

Die vollständige Stellungnahme liegt als PDF vor.

English translation: Statement on migration agreements with safe third countries

Wiener Stadtgespräch: “Welche Grenzen brauchen wir? Eine humane Migrations- und Asylpolitik ist möglich”

I was invited to speak about my book “What borders do we need?”, available in German at www.grenzen.eu. A humane migration and asylum policy is possible!

We need to leave behind metaphors from hydraulics in our thinking about borders and migration. The sooner we do this, the sooner will we get to a solution-oriented debate. The distinction between regular and irregular migration, and between humane and inhumane borders, is central to this.

Der Spiegel Title story on “the right refugee policy for Europe”

Spiegel Migration

Der Spiegel wrote a very good title story this week (25 August) on the right refugee policy for the EU, which Germany should push for. A coherent plan that could get majority support – and be presented as alternative to Nauru fantasies / push-back proposals of Salvini, Orban and co. The key recommendations in this article:

1. More assistance to countries close to crises hosting many refugees, and to UNHCR.

2. Control external borders to know who enters; identify and register those who do.

3. More resettlement: more ways for refugees and those who are politically persecuted to find their way to Europe legally.

4. Rescues: Europe has a duty to rescue those at risk of drowning. This should not be left to private organisations.

IMG_1966

5. European transit centres: there European experts should be able to determine within a few weeks whether somebody needs asylum; those who do not should not remain in Europe.

IMG_1967

6. Agreements on return: negotiate new types of agreements with African countries of origin for them to be willing to take back their citizens.

7. Contingents: offer annual legal migration contingents in return, so that countries such as Senegal, Gambia or Nigeria are ready to agree to new return agreements.

IMG_1969

8. Those who arrived in Germany before a set date should be able to acquire residence and work permits. Concentrate deportations on those who pose threats or are criminal.

 

Spiegel - wer darf rein

 

Implementation of a humane policy – start in the Aegean

The challenge is to find the way now to move from ideas to implementation.

One place to start is in the Aegean, right away.  The EU- Turkey agreement is based on these very principles – if it would actually be implemented in full:

– EU provides substantial financial help for refugees in Turkey (1)

– It allows for better control at external (Greek-Turkish) border (2)

– (Voluntary) resettlement of refugees from Turkey to EU  (3)

– Sharp decline in deaths in Aegean; everyone rescued in Greek waters is brought to Greece. (4)

– KEY CHALLENGE on Aegean islands: quick and fair decisions on who needs international protection in the EU and who can be returned to Turkey (or offered voluntary return to country of origin) (5)

– Return: Turkey agrees to take back those who do not need international protection in EU if they arrived in Greece after 20 March 2016 (6)

– Mobility: Turkey is offered visa liberalisation in return for full cooperation (while meeting mutually agreed key conditions set out in visa roadmap) (7)

– Cut-off date: the EU-Turkey statement has a cut-off date for returns to Turkey – those who arrived after March 2018 (8)

IMG_1962

 

Implementation of a humane policy: a place for rescuers to take people in Europe

At the same time there is an urgency to find a better way to deal with those rescued now in the Central Mediterraean , and to do so quickly.  The ESI’s Malta/Rome/Amsterdam/Sanchez Plan for the Mediterranean would achieve this, and also meet all the objectives and respect all the above principles.

 

(Two recommendations in the Spiegel article concern development policies in Africa and job creation programs in refugee camps: both go beyond issues we developed in our proposals).

Gesine Schwan und Gerald Knaus: Vorschlag für eine “europäische Antwort” auf die Flüchtlingsfrage, die sofort umgesetzt werden kann

Gerald Knaus and Gesine Schwan

ESI with EU Commissioner Oettinger at expert workshop: Unblocking the refugee relocation impasse? (15 May 2018)

Kernpunkte dieses Vorschlags sind: eine Koalition von betroffenen Staaten, in denen das Recht auf Asyl noch verteidigt werden soll; transparente und rechtskonforme Beschleunigung von Asylverfahren, schnelle Rückführungen jener, die keinen Schutz in der EU brauchen, freiwillige dezentrale Ansiedlung anerkannter Flüchtlinge und Umsiedlung von Schutzbedürftigen aus der Türkei. Und dadurch konkrete Ergebnisse noch vor dem Europaparlamentswahlen 2019.

  1. Im Format einer „Verstärkten Zusammenarbeit“ vereinbaren Frankreich und Deutschland im Verbund mit den Niederlanden, der Schweiz und Schweden den südeuropäischen Ankunftsländern Griechenland, Italien und Spanien solidarisch bei der Durchführung schneller qualitätsvoller Asylverfahren und der dezentralen Ansiedlung von anerkannten Asylbewerbern sowie bei der Rückführung nicht anerkannter Flüchtlinge zu helfen. Es geht um eine Demonstration von Erfolg, der die gesamte europäische Debatte beeinflussen soll: es ist möglich Kontrolle und Empathie zu verbinden.
  1. Die Asylverfahren sollen in griechischen, italienischen und gegebenenfalls spanischen Hotspots inspiriert vom niederländisch/schweizerischen Vorbild, das Qualität mit Geschwindigkeit verbindet, ablaufen. (Das ist im Einklang mit bestehendem nationalem Recht in diesen Ländern möglich). Durch sofortige Zuordnung von bezahlten Rechtsanwälten zu den Asylsuchenden und von Nichtregierungsorganisationen zu den Verfahren werden Schnelligkeit und Solidität der Verfahren erreicht. Einschließlich Revision brauchen sie dank juristischer Kompetenz und dank hergestellter Transparenz höchstens zwei Wochen bis zu einer Erstinstanz-Entscheidung, und weitere höchstens 6 Wochen bis zu einer Berufungsentscheidung. Personal aus anderen europäischen Ländern soll bei der kompetenten Prüfung der Asylanträge helfen. Die Asylzusage gilt für alle Mitgliedsländer der „Verstärkten Zusammenarbeit“.
  1. Für die anerkannten Flüchtlinge bieten die genannten Länder sofort eine freiwillige Aufnahme an, wie sie Deutschland aus Griechenland noch im Herbst 2017 durchführte. Zugleich wird ein neues Verfahren freiwilliger dezentraler Aufnahme von anerkannten Flüchtlingen durch die Kommunen und Städte eingerichtet. Kommunen sind eingeladen, auf der Basis beratender Multi-Stakeholder Beiräte (Vertreter der Gemeindeverwaltungen, der Unternehmen und von Nichtregierungsorganisationen, einschließlich, wenn möglich, wissenschaftlicher Beratung) darüber zu entscheiden, ob und in welcher Zahl sie im Rahmen ihrer eigenen weiteren Entwicklung Flüchtlinge aufnehmen wollen. Ihre Angebote schicken sie an die Hotspots, wo die anerkannten Flüchtlinge sich ihrerseits für drei Städte/Kommunen bewerben können. Hierzu muss ein Matching-System eingeführt werden.
  1. In der ersten Phase zahlen die Mitglieder der „Verstärkten Zusammenarbeit“ in einen Fonds ein, der außerhalb des EU-Haushalts angelegt ist und bei dem die Gemeinden die Erstattung ihrer Integrationskosten beantragen können. Sie erhalten dann für ihre eigene Entwicklung (Wohnungsbau, Infrastruktur, Bildung, Kultur etc.) zusätzlich die gleiche Summe.
  1. Perspektivisch sollte die EU im nächsten mehrjährigen Finanzrahmen einen solchen Fonds als „Kommunalen Integrations- und Entwicklungsfonds“ anlegen, der neben der Flüchtlingsintegration zielgenau kommunale Investitionen fördert. Die Mitgliedstaaten beschließen, Flüchtlingen, um die sich Kommunen aus ihrem Hoheitsbereich bewerben, die Einreise zu gestatten. Wenn sie das ablehnen, können ihre Kommunen aus dem Fonds keine Investitionsförderung erhalten.
  1. Jene deren Antrag abgelehnt wird oder bei denen entschieden wird, dass die Türkei für sie ein sicheres Land ist, werden in die Türkei zurückgeführt. Dazu wird eine glaubwürdige Ombudsperson für das Abkommen berufen, die in jedem Einzelfall der Frage der Behandlung jener nachgehen kann, die in die Türkei zurückgeschickt werden. Dazu werden wo möglich freiwillige Rückkehrprogramme in Herkunftsländer und Rückkehrberatung ausgebaut.
  1. Parallel beteiligen sich die Mitglieder der betroffenen Länder verstärkt bei der in der EU-Türkei-Erklärung vorgesehenen Umsiedlung von Schutzbedürftigen aus der Türkei.
  1. Ankara sollte weiters angeboten werden, die EU-Türkei-Erklärung auch auf die Landgrenze mit Griechenland auszudehnen – im Gegenzug könnte die schon versprochene finanzielle Hilfe für Flüchtlinge in der Türkei noch verlängert und aufgestockt werden (das ist im Interesse aller) .

 

Ein realistisches Szenario für Griechenland 2018

Eine realistische Annahme ist, dass im Rahmen einer solchen Initiative die Zahl derjenigen, die aus der Türkei nach Griechenland kommen, zunächst schnell wieder auf das Niveau der ersten Jahreshälfte 2017 fällt (mit etwa 1.500 Ankommenden im Monat), und dann noch niedriger. Wenn 1.000 abgelehnte Asylwerber im Monat in die Türkei zurückgeschickt würden, würde die Zahl der Ankommenden schnell fallen.

Dafür sollten EU-Staaten für jeden in Griechenland von dieser Mission anerkannten Flüchtling (500 im Monat?) einen Flüchtling aus Griechenland aufnehmen, und die Zahl der Umsiedlungen aus der Türkei ausbauen (auf mindestens 2.000 im Monat).  So könnte die EU Griechenland helfen, die unzumutbaren Zustände auf den griechischen Inseln beseitigen, ein Model für schnelle qualitätsvolle Asylverfahren liefern, den Balkan entlasten, und den Druck auf die Grenzen Deutschlands spürbar reduzieren. Und all das im Einklang mit europäischem Recht und ohne Asylsuchende schlecht zu behandeln. Und die Verteilung anerkannter Flüchtlinge könnte zum Ausbau eines auf Freiwilligkeit beruhenden Systems flexibler europäischer Solidarität führen.

 

Mehr über das niederländische Asylverfahren: “Amsterdam in the Mediterranean” – How a Dutch-style asylum system can help resolve the Mediterranean refugee crisis (26 January 2018)

Mehr über den Vorschlag: FAZ, “Niemand sollte jahrelang in der Luft hängen” (23 April 2018)

As Italy votes – by John Dalhuisen and Gerald Knaus

As Italy votes – the case for a humane migration policy that works
John Dalhuisen and Gerald Knaus

“Those making moral calculations must reflect on the fact that the only real alternative – in this imperfect world – is not something better, but something much worse.”

italian-election-2018-explained-everything-you-need-to-know-before-italy-vote-here

Just over a year ago, the Italian government struck a deal with the Libyan authorities to intercept migrants trying to cross the Mediterranean. Following the arrival of half a million refugees and migrants in just three years, the centre-left Democratic Party – the same party that set up the ambitious search and rescue operation, Mare Nostrum, back in 2013 – decided that it had to act. A short Memorandum of Understanding was followed by a string of agreements with Libyan mayors and tribal leaders negotiated – often personally – by Italy’s Minister of Interior, Marco Minniti. The policy had an immediate effect: arrivals in the second half of 2017 were down 70 percent compared to the same period the year before, and deaths at sea declined equally sharply.

Italy’s Libya strategy was backed by the rest of the EU but has been roundly criticised by NGOs and UN agencies for trapping thousands of migrants in a lawless country, in which they risk torture, extortion and slavery, sometimes at the hands of the very groups these agreements were struck with. The Libyan coast guard stands accused of handing over those it intercepts to inhumane detention centres, where abuse is common.

And yet, as Italians head to the polls today one thing looks certain: whichever coalition forms the next government, it is likely to continue the policy of the current minister of the interior, who has become one of the most popular politicians in the country. No political party polling more than a few percent is opposed to the policy. In an election dominated by migration, promising to control borders is a pre-requisite for success.

This sobering reality highlights the true challenge for those who care about the right of refugees and migrants trapped in Libya. It is this: how can one persuade those who will shape Italy’s Mediterranean policy in the coming years that a policy that combines control with empathy, effectiveness with humanity, and reduced irregular migration with human rights is not only possible but also electorally preferable for the next Italian government?

A humane policy must aim for zero deaths at sea. It must ensure that all those rescued by European boats have access to a fair, effective asylum procedure. It must ensure that nobody who is intercepted by the Libyan coast guard ends up in inhumane detention centres. And it must protect those in need of protection from being pushed back into danger in their home countries.

How can these goals be met? The next Italian government should propose to its European partners a realistic plan that includes the following four elements.

First, a common effort is needed to ensure sufficient search and rescue capacity beyond Libya’s territorial waters. In the first six months of 2017 more than 2,500 refugees and migrants drowned. 600 people still drowned in the second half of the year despite the reduction in departures. Instead of demonising NGO rescue boats or leaving it to the Libyan coast guard or the Italian authorities, all European countries should make an even bigger effort.

Second, Western support to the Libyan coast guard and the Libyan authorities should be linked to a clear condition: that anybody intercepted/rescued by its boats and taken back to Libya should be offered immediate evacuation to Niger by IOM. The numbers involved make this possible: in 2017 the Libyan coast guard intercepted less than 1,500 people a month on average. In Niger, those who choose not to apply for asylum should be offered assisted return to their countries of origin via IOM. Those who do should be resettled to a safe country if found to be in need of protection. The same should happen with all those (around 5,000) currently held in Libyan detention centres.

Third, securing European agreements with key African countries of origin for the return of all failed asylum seekers arriving after an agreed date should be a priority. The challenge is to find a humane, legal way of reducing irregular economic migration. This can best be achieved by changing the incentives that currently exist for would be economic migrants. Currently the only disincentives to travelling to Europe are the cost and the risk of the journey. The vast majority of migrants who make it to Italy can be confident that they will be able to stay, whether they are granted international protection or not. Last year 130,000 people applied for asylum in Italy, a majority from West African countries. The same year 12,000 applicants were granted international protection. But (almost) everybody stays in Europe, regardless of their asylum status. One obvious reason for this is the reluctance of countries of origin to cooperate in the identification and return of their citizens. In 2016 more than 100,000 people arrived in Italy from six West African nations; around 4,300 citizens of these countries were granted international protection. And 255 returned, voluntarily or by force. Successive Italian authorities have found it easiest to allow migrants to either move on to other European countries, or integrate, however precariously, into Italy’s thriving black economy. Countries of origins should be offered an annual contingent of regular visas (not just by Italy) for work or study. Such agreements will only work if they are found to be in the interests of countries of origin.

Fourth, seriously discouraging irregular economic migration also requires a quick, but fair, asylum process that should seek to award a protection status or move to deport those found to have no claim within two to three months at most. This need not come at the expense of quality: the Netherlands have one of the best systems in Europe and it consistently delivers informed decisions within this timeframe. It may require keeping most asylum-seekers in closed centres for this duration. It would certainly require the financial and administrative support of other EU countries, which should relocate recognized asylum seekers. This would not be cheap to run, or easy to set up, but as a joint European effort it is doable.

This plan would not end all arrivals in Europe – which is not the goal – but it would sharply reduce numbers – which is. It would create legal channels for refugees and economic migrants. It would reduce deaths at sea and not condemn people to torture in Libyan detention centres. It would guarantee access to asylum for those who do reach Italy and uphold the core principles of the Refugee convention for those who do not.

But would such a “Rome plan” be in the interest of the next Italian government? We believe that it would. Italian politics highlights realities which are true for most of the EU today. Any political party that fails to promise to control borders renders itself unelectable. At the same time there are a lot of voters who care about the right to asylum and do not want to see those who cross borders treated inhumanely. Offering such policies would distinguish mainstream parties, on the left and on the right, from racists on the far-right.

And the human rights community? Many will welcome the commitment to legal paths, but baulk at the prospect of more returns, faster procedures and closed asylum processing centres. But those making moral calculations must reflect on the fact that the only real alternative – in this imperfect world – is not something better, but something much worse. Demagogues are best defeated by demonstrating – with conviction and through effective policies – that a world in which empathy has a central place, is possible.

Such a plan is in Italy’s interest. The EU should back it. So should anyone who cares about human rights in the Mediterranean and about the welfare of those so desperately trying to cross it.

 

John Dalhuisen is ESI Senior Fellow and former director for Europe @ Amnesty International; Gerald Knaus is ESI founding chairman

 

John Dalhuisen